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This paper was created as a result of discussions with the students from the 
Evangelical Theological Seminary in Osijek, as part of the Introduction into 
Philosophy course. In the paper we used parts of Luka Đukić’s essay, “Memo-
rial Centers: The Role of Memory,” which have, as part of dialogue regarding 
the role of memory, been inserted into the text by J. Mladenovska-Tešija. The 
purpose of the paper is to emphasize the relevance of Ricoeur’s reflections 
about memory for Evangelical Christians, especially considering Christ’s de-
ath on Calvary as an anti-narrative.
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Introduction
Luka: “This experience of mine was born after I visited the Jasenovac memorial 
site. It was a moment when I experienced a great internal struggle because I 
was faced with something I’ve never noticed before: I, Luka, possess collective 
memory.”
This paper deals primarily with memory. And although remembrance and me-
mory are usually used as synonyms in the vernacular, in the scientific discourse 
there is a difference between these two phrases, and even used antithetically in 
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a way. Thus, remembrance is usually related to reminiscing past events, and it 
involves an intimacy of the experience and of that which is directly known, while 
memory deals with intentional and permanent adopting, retaining that which 
has been memorized, and connecting it with more recent contents.
The questions of why we remember things and in what way, why are the-
re things that we remember and things which we forget, and what is their role 
and meaning, have become important on the wave of the critique of historicism 
and are more recent. Namely, they were first tackled by Hugo von Hofmannsthal 
(1902) and Maurice Halbwachs (1925), who emphasized that memory is a social 
and not an individual phenomenon. 1 Inside the mind, certain memories are re-
membered if they have found their purpose/meaning within the collective me-
mory. In that sense, collective memory (as well as oblivion!) can be differentiated 
both by the type of society, i.e., the social order, and by their function. They are 
mostly lead by reiterating losses which require healing in action or in calling for 
oblivion of all those things which do not fit into defined history.
On Ricouer’s trail, this paper calls for questioning the memory by including 
not only the dominant, but also of contingent events as well as counter-narrati-
ves which cause disagreements inside a whole which strives for a comprehensive 
consensus. An example of such a counter-narrative is Christ’s death on the cross; 
an act that describes the death of God in extreme and quite human agony. The 
memory of this event teaches us that dissonant voices of history are important 
(although they failed to fit the dominant narrative at a certain point), and the 
event at Calvary contributed to the formation of our identity as a representation 
of trauma and as an image of God that differs from what is expected: a wounded, 
immanent, loving God who calls on us to accept our otherness as part of our own 
identity as a necessary path towards healing for eternity.
Wounded Identities
Luka:  “My experience at the Jasenovac memorial site was... terrifying. I was over-
whelmed and unprepared for something like that. Emotions woke up inside 
me which I never realized I had. I was instantaneously dragged into a wave of 
hatred. I wanted revenge, and at the same time I felt alienated from everyone. 
Are memorial sites about healing, or are they the dark heralds of the message 
of evil? Do they open me up to thinking about the future, or do they shut me 
inside a perpetual circle of violence and revenge? Why do I, Luka, feel all 
 1  Find more in: Agičić, Damir (ed. in chief). 2010. Historijski zbornik (Historical Anthology) 
LXIII/1. 269-311; Brkljačić, Maja and Prlenda Sandra (ed.). 2006. Kultura pamćenja i histo-
rija (Culture of Memory, And History). Zagreb: Golden Marketing/Tehnička knjiga.
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these wounds? Why has that which is mine inside become mixed in with a 
collective pain of a nation?”
Our memory is like a dream: it is personal, emotional, and associative; it brings 
us back to the things we have once experienced; it makes us look into past events 
and finds a deeper meaning that is going to connect our past with our present. 
Memory is inseparably tied to our identity; as individuals, we are not indepen-
dent from the collective, but have from the very beginning been immersed into a 
direct experience of the collective memory. Therefore, Ricoeur emphasizes that 
memory is a social product that is transferred via language and is, thus, suscepti-
ble to various manipulations.
Paul Ricoeur is one of the more interesting philosophers of the 20th century. 
And right now, I’ll be placing and intentional colon: he is interesting to those 
“wisdom lovers” who are attracted to onto-hermeneutical reflections and synop-
tic discourse. Maybe this is one of the reasons why he was partly put aside when 
compared to Lacan and the post-structuralists, both in France and elsewhere. 
Deep, insightful, and always in dialogue with other philosophers who were, in 
a way, theoretically intertwined with his own reflections, and which develop or 
critique his own ideas, Ricoeur’s constant preoccupation was the question of the 
meaning of life and the hermeneutics of self. Ricoeur is also known as a Chri-
stian philosopher, even though his philosophical works do not use nor promote 
theological concepts. Namely, he led the John Nuveen philosophical theology de-
partment at the University of Chicago Divinity School for 25 years (1967-1992). 
His most famous works include “La Métaphore vive,” (The Rule of Metaphor) “Du 
texte à l’action,” (From Text to Action) “Soi-même comme un autre,” (Oneself As 
Another) three-tome “Temps et récit,” (Time and Narrative) then “La mémoire, 
l’histoire, l’oubli,” (Memory, History, Forgetting) “Le Conflit des interprétations, Es-
sais d’herméneutique,” “De l’interprétation,” “Essai sur Sigmund Freud,” and many 
others.
According to Ricoeur, our identity is “vulnerable” and “dialectical” (Ricoeur 
2011, 82). In his book, Time and Narrative, he lists three sources of the identity’s 
vulnerability: time, threat, and violence. Starting with the presupposition that 
our existence has been determined by “two worlds” - the natural world (where we 
belong as physical beings), and the phenomenological world of freedom (which 
means that we are able to influence our circumstances up to a degree and that we 
are able to change ourselves through our activities), it is at the same time filled 
with other dualities, such as harmony and discord; the experience and the acco-
unt; creation and stratification; facts and fiction; conscious and unconscious; the 
author and the reader (Ricoeur 1978, 149-166). 
In this sense, he outlines the first problem with the vulnerability of identi-
ty - the one that relates to time - which is itself twofold in its very nature. We 
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strive for coherence (in the sense of logical and emotional consistency between 
these two simultaneous processes and the mutual dependence between thought 
and action), but we also strive for continuance/stability during the time. Ricoe-
ur differentiates between the physical/natural world (cosmological, or objective 
time, according to Aristotle), and the time of consciousness (phenomenological 
time, according to Augustine). Our cosmological time began with our birth; it is 
continued with our life, and it ends with our death - the events which determine 
various stages in our lives. However, phenomenological time is related to activity, 
and is characterized by continuity and coherence. To them, Ricoeur adds a third 
- narrative - time which is connected to purposeful conscious activity and which 
connects the time of previous generations and culture in the path of their stories/
narratives and memory (Ricoeur 1990, 83-84). Our human experience encompa-
sses all these modalities of time and, in terms of identity, it points to the problem 
of sameness and duration. Namely, in Me/Self as Others, Ricoeur establishes a 
complex structure of our identity, which is made up from sameness (idem, lat.) 
and ipse, or self (ipse, lat.). Our character proves that the strict Cartesian division 
into the body and spirit is unsustainable: idem as the sameness/duration is not just 
a characteristic of our body, in the same way that ipse/self isn’t just a characteristic 
of our spirit (Ricoeur 2011, 81). In contrast to the so-called “narrowed physicality 
model” that Ricoeur is criticizing, having in mind primarily Nietzsche and Freud, 
where the body is just a remnant or a continuation of the psychological “self,” the 
body is not an unnecessary part nor a negative aspect of the subject and the per-
sonal identity, quite the contrary: to become and understand self is only possible 
through the body, the others, and consciousness (Ricoeur 2011, 82). 
The otherness is the second form of our identity’s vulnerability, because it is 
different. For the idem, the most important thing is duration, sameness, stability, 
immutability. As the sameness, our identity excludes any dialogue with anything 
outside ourselves. Here, otherness is understood as dissimilarity, and even the 
opposite which is not a result of mere comparison with others but constitutes 
sameness. Therefore (within the identity of sameness), we find it hard to un-
derstand that the network of human society is made up of a multitude of people 
who do not share our beliefs, nor even our way of life. Our sameness acts in an 
exclusive manner towards the otherness and rejects everything it does not reco-
gnize as similar (Ricoeur 2011, 81). In here lies the third root of our identity’s 
vulnerability, the one that is related to violence. Namely, according to Ricoeur, 
there is not a single human community which was not created through violence 
or war. The things we most commonly celebrate are violent events which became 
legitimate, and not just by becoming a generally accepted thing in a nation’s hi-
story at certain point, but also due to the fact that they happened a long time ago. 
So, these same events which are so glorious for one group are a great humiliation 
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for another. In this way, real and symbolic wounds are placed in the collective 
memory archive (Ricoeur 2011, 81-82). 
Underlying this reflection of Ricoeur’s is the need to get out of the framework 
of the Cartesian cogito, which places a pure subject as the first point in the quest 
for the truth. And, even though he was inspired by Husserl, he adopts his pheno-
menological method with a critical distance, and he denies the thinking subject 
its ability to postulate themselves as a completely isolated unit (or a monade, if 
we use Leibnitz), a self-sufficient bearer of phenomenological processes. Since 
Ricoeur did not consider method to be separate from the truth, i.e., the decision 
regarding the method is the decision regarding the approach to truth, a pheno-
menological method if adopted in Husserl’s fashion, according to Ricoeur it leads 
into idealism which makes it impossible to know the individual as he is immer-
sed into the world (Ricoeur 1967, 7). That is why Ricoeur introduces narration, 
about which he says that it is more than a mere event, because it is connected to 
that which is happening inside and outside of us. In that sense, the hermeneutic 
method proposed by Ricoeur demands that the focus should not be kept on us 
alone, but on the broader surroundings as well, and it includes questions we do 
not understand and which we are trying to find the answers to. In this process 
of understanding and self-understanding, the key role is played by interpretation 
and intentionality of consciousness because hermeneutical consciousness, in his 
mind, is such that it is always focused on something (Ricoeur 1967, 205). Our 
self-knowledge has been conditioned and mediated through language. This me-
ans that our identity is, in its essence, narrative in nature, i.e., that it is susceptible 
to active self-interpretation: it is not absolutely mutable, but is neither rigorous or 
immutable; therefore, Ricoeur insists on a constant process of self-interpretation. 
In the phrase “self-as-others,” Ricoeur will connect the first two; he will emphasi-
ze the connection between identities as idem and ipse, and he will emphasize its 
temporality. As basis, he takes the ipse/self, which contains “otherness” in itself as 
a relationship of the implication: self, in terms of others. We see that, in such a de-
termination of identity, Ricoeur actually settles the score with the subject philo-
sophy legacy, where the subject is expressed in the first person - “I.” Noticing the 
problem with this stance, i.e., that the cogito strives to be an apodictic point which 
is taken for granted without any questioning of its foundation, i.e., of everything 
this foundation makes possible or what it establishes, Ricoeur emphasizes that a 
stable and fixed identity excludes contingency, temporality, and mundanity, but 
also the other, at which the self is inevitably pointed towards. In Ricoeur’s mind, 
quite the opposite is true: our own self is built through the mediation of language 
and stories; it is not a passive-receiving process, but an active quest for “personal 
configuration and self-interpretation” (Brnčić 2008, 734). 
We are and are not who we were several years ago: within the mutable self 
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“there emerges, as it were, an internal another self; a self which, as it lives, reads, 
interprets, and understands itself in time, always becomes someone else.” (Brn-
čić 2008, 735). This means that each person is primarily a “project” that they 
set before themselves, a “created synthesis” (Ricoeur 1965, 69) in a global world 
where any calling for responsibility means being placed within certain boundari-
es which can be overcome at the same time they were created. The subject which 
emerges here is not apodictic (Descartes) nor it is subjected to transcendental 
apperception (Kant), but is present, contingent, and dynamic, always emergence 
and physical, i.e., it has the ability to become embodied into new roles and posi-
tions/contexts in the same way a text can appear differently in different reading 
sessions. It is the same and the other; otherness is part of the basis of our identity 
as much as sameness is.
Vulnerable Memory
Luka:  So, when we stop observing objects as purely material structures which only 
have one purpose that is realized in its own functionality, and when we begin 
to view other dimensions of the objects, as a symbol, as the bearer of a truly 
historic moment which is still unusually alive in some way, still present, and 
even more so when the object is observed as a language which brings us a 
message and which can be communicated and interacted with, a new under-
standing of the object is opened. The understanding that Jasenovac is a lan-
guage, a meaning, and a message. This aspect is enormously important for 
memorial sites. These events, which are often so tragic and dark, and almost 
surreal in their horror, is what the memorial sites are trying to preserve; not 
with the purpose of making them an open wound that will contribute to con-
flict, nor in order to make a curiosity and a spectacle out of them. The main 
purpose of memorial sites is primarily to warn, to honor the victims, and 
to establish memories which shall be put into context of past, present, and 
future by the events from the past. Thus, instead of human evil and nothing-
ness, our eyes will point towards those Others; towards meeting together, and 
forgiveness.
In analyzing the spread of the idea of memorial sites, Susan Sontag claimed that 
they were a result of the “way mourning is expressed due to the annihilation of Eu-
ropean Jews in the 1930’s and 1940’s and of reflecting on it,” and they became insti-
tutionally implemented in the Yad Vashem Museum in Jerusalem, in the Holocaust 
Memorial Museum in Washington D.C., and in the Jewish Museum in Berlin (Son-
tag 2005, 69). The purpose of these public repositories is not only to display various 
material remains, but also to “make sure that the crimes which they are portraying 
would be retained in the consciousness of the people” (Sontag 2005, 69). 
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In this sense, the “space of solemnity,” (Sontag 2005, 91) or the object within 
which the memory is happening, plays an important role in the collective me-
mory. Spatiality can be expressed through the so-called “landscapes of memory” 
(Assmann 2008, 111), where markings/monuments are placed in the natural spa-
ce. Depending on where the monuments were built and who built them, they re-
flect the memory that is tied to national myths, ideals, and political needs. Some 
refer to the victims of wars, other are calling for resistance, while yet others speak 
about mass murders as reflective of the nation’s cultural memory. That is why 
Winter thinks that monuments are a reference point of memory for all those who 
have experienced a traumatic event but are also the reference point of memory 
for all those who were born after them. In this way, the very term, “memory,” be-
comes a metaphor in that it grows into a narrative about the past, especially after 
the death of direct eyewitnesses (Winter 2010, 62). The space inside memorial 
sites, on the other hands, makes it possible to portray the suffering as “unique,” 
but also as an act which people have implemented “of their own free will, and 
even with excitement, as they felt that justice was on their side.” This is why the 
memory of traumatic events is referred to as an “ethical act,” which calls upon us 
to take responsibility for what has been done, but also to act in the direction of 
overcoming the conditions which lead to perpetual violence, while making it po-
ssible to establish a direct “relationship with the dead” at the same time (Sontag 
2005, 91).
A feature of our time, says Ricoeur at the beginning of his study, Memory, 
History, and Oblivion, is the simultaneous existence of too much memory on one 
side and too much oblivion on another. Too much memory only occurs where 
there is too much suffering because the suffering takes over the memory and 
does not allow oblivion to take over. Memory that is burdened by suffering is 
blind to the suffering of others, and excess memory is thus followed with a par-
ticular kind of blindness which does not allow us to see reality as it is (Ricoeur 
2004, 444). Our identity is subjected to the ideology which is key for “manipu-
lating memory” (Ricoeur 2004, 448). Communities are not only required to be 
open to the past and to remember it, but also to remember it in a certain way, in 
accordance with ethical and political standards which violate the “natural course 
of memory” (Ricoeur 2004, 84). Ricoeur uses this phrase in order to contrast it to 
the external, thought-out interventions in the course of memory. As an example 
of these interventions, he lists political interventions which, according to him, are 
always at the side of oblivion.
Memory manipulation is possible because our understanding of the world 
and of other people is inexorably connected with our own self-understanding, 
and vice-versa. Our identity is not a static one-off given; an ontological cogito. 
True self-revelation starts in the moment when our ego begins to radically reject 
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the conscious’ secret desire to establish itself as an absolute, and when it allows 
spontaneity which breaks ego’s sterile circle in its constant return to self (Ricoeur 
1965, 14). In this way, I have been called to “actively participate in my own incar-
nation” through understanding, comparison, and making decisions. This kind of 
openness of identity, which is at the same time being pointed towards others, is 
followed by a constant battle which manifests itself as decision making and selec-
tion. The narrative is selective in itself, Ricoeur points out as he establishes a close 
connection between declarative history, narration, testimonies, and representati-
on of historical past. Ideologization of memory is possible due to the existence of 
various (selective) narratives (Ricoeur 2004, 448).  A story can be told in different 
ways, Ricoeur claims in the article, “Respecting others, and the cultural identity” 
which at the same time opens us to manipulation, but also for critical questio-
ning. Forgetting and oblivion can take the shape of erasing or pushing to the side. 
Abuse of memory is, at the same time, abuse of oblivion. Namely, before abuse, 
there is use, which is in itself inevitably selective in relation to the narrative. If 
we are unable to remember everything, then we also cannot put all the pieces 
together correctly. The idea that there is an extensive, comprehensive narrative is 
actually impossible in terms of performance (Ricoeur 2004, 414). 
Artifacts play a great role in the fight against oblivion. This is why historians 
often reach for opposing testimonies, causing a confrontation between fragmen-
ted narratives, which makes it possible for various “voices” could be heard regar-
ding a single event, which is why Ricoeur will look at the science of history as a 
corrective to memory (Ricoeur 2011, 86). The similar is stated by Foucault, altho-
ugh from the position of a critic of the official history which, according to him, is 
a product of monopolizing practices of manufacturing information, which is why 
he emphasizes the importance of the counter-narrative. Therefore, he says that 
the official history creates and maintains unity and continuity of a political body 
by imposing an interpretation of common past and by marginalizing alternati-
ve interpretations of historical experiences. In this sense, the counter-historical 
narratives disrupt the established unity which is created by official histories. That 
is why it is under the pressure of challenges and alternatives, as well as “coun-
ter-memory” as a space in which resistance is shown against official versions of 
the historical continuity (Foucault 1977, 135). Ricoeur draws two conclusions 
in relation to reflecting on the vulnerable nature of historic knowledge: the first 
refers to the so-called mnemonic representation, while the other refers to the 
contrast between memory and history. He holds that it is only by way of revision 
and rewriting history in light of new narratives that the historians will be able to 
consider the entirety of past events and create a picture about what really happe-
ned. On the other hand, the contrast between memory and history is the contrast 
between loyalty to (ideology) and truth, and it cannot be resolved on a phenome-
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nological level but needs to be transferred to another level; the level of the history 
reader, i.e., an educated citizen. Ultimately, the final decision is in the hands of 
the readers, who will determine for themselves what sort of balance needs to be 
placed between memory and history, i.e., which sort of balance is useful (Ricoeur 
2010, 449-450). 
Going back to the thesis that our memory is the result of constant mediati-
on between the moments of distancing and adopting, Ricoeur emphasizes that, 
in order to be able to make a correct decision, the individual needs to distance 
themselves from the memory of the past and the way it appears in our consci-
ousness, and in doing this to recognize the attributions/adoptions of memories 
which are connected to feelings, both negative ones but especially the feelings of 
happiness, peace, reconciliation, and everything we wish for ourselves and our 
loved ones. For most people, claims Ricoeur, the identity of the person/commu-
nity is made up of all those value identifications with norms, ideals, role-models, 
heroes, in which the person/community identify with. This does not mean that 
we only identify ourselves within the dominant social narrative, but also through 
dissonant stories/individuals, thus contributing to the creation of the counter-
narrative (Ricoeur 2010, 496).
According to Ricoeur, the core of the problem with memory is in the fact 
that it becomes mobilized for the purpose of searching for and creating identity. 
Rüssen, too, emphasizes that memory mobilizes the experience of the past, pro-
vides a framework and contents to the present, and makes the future possible. 
All the historical narratives represent the inner unity of all three dimensions 
of time, giving them the characteristics of continuity. They also make identity 
formation possible, because they provide a sense of duration and stability in a 
world which is constantly going through changes (Rüssen 1987, 92). Collectivity 
has no moral consciousness. When faced with guilt and external accusations, 
people tend to withdraw into the reminiscence of past hatreds and old humiliati-
ons (Ricoeur 2010, 477). This is why we cannot emphasize the power of memory 
in creating the present and the future. This power has very often proved to be 
destructive.
The images of dead civilians and destroyed houses can serve to amplify ha-
tred towards the enemy... As a contrast, the images which contradict the favorite 
patriotic stereotypes are unequivocally rejected as false. The usual reaction to 
photographic evidence of the wrongs committed by one’s own side is to declare 
them as false and to deny that such wrongs ever happened (Sontag 2005, 13).
By analyzing the photographs of atrocities, Sontag emphasizes that they can 
cause quite the opposite reaction, to call for peace or to vengeance, or to empha-
size “the confused discovery, constantly deepened by photographic information 
of atrocities happening” (Sontag 2005, 14-15). For Sontag, collective memory is 
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“the agreement that this is important and here is how it happened,” supported by 
images which have become engraved into our memory. “Ideologies confirm this 
by using image archives; the symbolic images which summarize the important 
commonplace issues, and which cause predictable thoughts and feelings” (Sontag 
2005, 68). To strive for maintaining memory - to remember in that sense - means 
that “we have taken upon ourselves the task of permanent renewal and creation 
of memory... Today, many victimized peoples wish to have their own memorial 
museum, a temple that will be home to a comprehensive, chronologically organi-
zed, illustrated history of their suffering” (Sontag 2005, 69). However, we do not 
only go to memorial sites just because of sympathy and compassion, nor because 
of the feeling that, as long we sympathize, we are not culprits in what is causing 
the suffering. We go to the places of suffering also because those places are much 
more than “reminders of death, failure, victimization: they remind us of the mi-
racle of surviving” (Sontag 2005, 69). 
The Death of God: the Importance of Remembering the Counter-
Narrative
Luka:  Each group needs to come to grips with memory. They need to go through the 
process of healing and forgiveness, and to remember their own mistakes. To 
fit the counter-narratives of resistance into the collective memory. There is no 
other way. The only way out of this entrapping circle built out of hate, refusal 
to forgive, and revenge is to face the past for what it is. This is difficult. But if 
we, who live in this war-torn region, would dare to take this step, the process 
of healing of both the collective identity and the individuals who share these 
identities, would begin.
Calvary, a moving image of God dying in agony and torment. This counter-narra-
tive is the crack in the structure of Biblical text. It ceases to be text and turns into 
a historical moment, where space is the place of memory, and time is without 
duration and forever bound to the painful experience. Silence has been broken 
by a groan, a cry, a feeling of abandonment, of loneliness, of pain in the body and 
mind of the helpless man-God.
The counter-narrative in the representations of the death on the cross is not 
only in the fact that a miracle has happened (i.e., God is dead) but also in the fact 
that Christ was much “more” than all other religious figures  (Buddha, Moham-
mad, Moses): he is the “highest” thing, the Holy One in relation to the creation. 
In the moment in which he reveals himself as a human being, a unique historical 
event takes place, which sees its absolute climax in death: God’s perfect transcen-
dence can be manifested and shown to people only as an immanent imperfection 
of the human form. The lack of positive elements in portraying the events of 
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death only emphasizes the tension: and while the Greek hero is an individual 
who can become a paradigm for all on account of his “essential universality,” 
Christ is an “exemplary individual” (Žižek and Milbank 2009, 67) who establishes 
a pattern which is unattainable for humans except for God’s direct intervention. 
Christ’s life is both “cenotic” (Žižek) and “glorified/holy” (Milbank): on the cross, 
he experienced complete unification with the creation (i.e., in his death throes he 
becomes man in the full sense of the word) and became completely holy (i.e., he 
became, that is, remained God through the act of absolute obedience and throu-
gh the consequent resurrection). The experience of suffering portrays God in a 
light completely different from what we would expect: at the moment of his death 
on the cross, God was not the God of triumph nor of happy endings. This was the 
God who took the agony of humanity upon himself; the God of whom Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer, when faced with Nazism and suffering, wrote that only a suffering 
God is able to help us (Bohnhoeffer 1967, 361). The trauma on the cross breaks 
the narrative; the event at Calvary is not a simple encounter between life and 
death, but a re-figuration of life and death as such! In the events that followed, 
the dead “hero” transforms into the living God; the singular person has been 
canceled out in the resurrected identity of the community; repentance for sins is 
followed by the ultimate act of forgiveness which has been ensured for the whole 
of humanity.
Speaking about the paradox of religious memory, Ricoeur emphasizes that 
“Abrahamic memory” is transferred through pairs of terms that are rarely seen in 
other narratives: we are primarily referring to the pair of “forgiveness-repentan-
ce” (Ricoeur 2004, 490). The message to the forgiven humanity is clear: through 
the act of God’s death on the cross, it becomes capable of much more than mere 
evil and bearing its own guilt. It can be restored within focus action that is fo-
cused on Christ. So, this great event becomes a “traumatic imprint on the heart 
and body,” but also a “sign of protest” that defies oblivion and that “demands to 
be verbalized, reconsidered, and understood;” it can be challenged, but not abo-
lished (Ricoeur 2004, 498). We can go as far as to say that the New Testament as 
the tale of Christ as a whole is actually a counter-narrative: Christ bears witness 
through word and deed to his very death, and all of that becomes history through 
oral and written testimonies by eye-witnesses (in this case, his disciples as well as 
other followers). At the same time, the New Testament narrative is also “the testi-
mony of the Absolute One,” because God Himself is involved in the story, both as 
an eye-witness and as a narrative witness (Ricoeur 1995, 117). 
Christ is not an idea nor a metaphor; he is a concrete, human, and historical 
person as well as a living God, and the Christian faith includes history, i.e., the 
work, the person and the event of God’s incarnation, death, and resurrection. In 
this sense, the fullness of discipleship includes both man and God, and a plan for 
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humanity. Therefore, the memory of the counter-narrative of the death on the 
cross, as a representation of a traumatic event and a dissonant narrative/voice 
which gives us a picture of God that is different to that of a heroic hero, strongly 
influences the building of a coherent image of the individual and collective iden-
tities of Christ’s followers. As a death that ultimately leads to resurrection, it is a 
prerequisite for the development of Christian identity, primarily as a narrative of 
healing. Its saving message makes it possible to integrate trauma into the horizon 
of hope, as well as death which does not end in human non-existence, but which 
leads into a new life in eternity. Therefore, following Christ must be understood 
as a call to obey the commandment of love: towards God, oneself, our neighbor, 
our enemy; love which takes part in building the Kingdom, that has already star-
ted in the moment when God first loved us.
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Translated from Croatian by Davor Edelinski
Julijana Mladenovska-Tešija, Luka Đukić
Ranjivost identiteta i pamćenja: 
Jasenovac, Ricoeur i smrt Boga
Sažetak
Ovaj je rad nastao kao rezultat diskusija koje su se vodile sa studentima Visokoga 
evanđeoskoga teološkog učilišta u Osijeku, u okviru kolegija Uvod u filozofiju. U 
radu su korišteni dijelovi eseja studenta Luke Đukića “Memorijalni centri: uloga 
pamćenja” koji su, u cilju dijaloga o ulozi pamćenja, umetnuti unutar teksta J. 
Mladenovske-Tešije. Cilj je rada ukazati na relevantnost Ricoeurova razmišljanja 
o pamćenju za evanđeoske kršćane, posebice imajući u vidu Kristovu smrti na 
Golgoti kao protunarativ.
